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1. Introduction
The model developed by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) has become a basic reference to
explain the empirically evident negative correlation between income inequality and eco-
nomic growth. Alesina and Rodrik found that a government that maximizes utility of
the median voter does not maximize growth of the economy and that the growth rate is
the lower the more unequal the income distribution. Their approach, however, has been
criticized for two reasons. First, taxes are voted upon only at time zero, and, second, the
tax rate is required to be constant over time. Especially, Krusell et al. (1997) argue that
the equilibrium in Alesina and Rodrik is not time consistent.
In this note, we relax the assumption that the government credibly commits to constant
tax rates and generalize the model of Alesina and Rodrik towards a dynamic game. We
show that the solution obtained by Alesina and Rodrik is a time consistent Markovian
Stackelberg equilibrium in a differential game between the government and the median
voter.
2. The Model
We consider the model established by Alesina and Rodrik and follow their notation.
The aggregate production function of the economy is of the Cobb-Douglas type and linear
homogenous in the privately provided factors capital, k, and labor, l, as well as in the
private capital and productive government spending, g. The economy is thus capable of
long-run growth.
The government runs a balanced budget and finances productive spending by a tax
rate τ on private capital. In contrast to Alesina and Rodrik, we do not assume that
the government credibly commits itself to a constant tax rate. In order to derive a time
consistent solution, we require instead that the government makes its current (possibly
non-linear) choice of the tax rate dependent on the state of the system, namely the median
voter’s current stock of capital, i.e. it uses a Markovian (feedback) strategy.
Output is produced by a large number of identical competitive firms so that wages and
gross interest rates are obtained as
r = αAτ1−α ,(1)
w = (1− α)Aτ1−αk ≡ ωk ,(2)
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where α is the capital share and A > 0 denotes general productivity. The economy is
populated by a large number of individuals, which are indexed by their relative factor
endowment. Relative factor endowment of the i-th individual is then given by
(3) σi =
li
ki/k
, σi ∈ [0,∞) .
Labor is supplied inelastically and aggregate labor supply is normalized to one. Each
individual i maximizes intertemporal utility from consumption taking the time paths of
taxes and aggregate capital as given, i.e. he solves
(4) max
ci
∫ ∞
0
log cie−ρtdt
subject to his budget constraint
(5) k˙i = wli + (r − τ)ki − ci
and the no-Ponzi-game rule
(6) lim
t→∞ k
ie
∫ t
0 (r−τ)ds ≥ 0 ,
with state variable ki ≥ 0 and control variable ci ≥ 0.
Using the tax rate τ , the government maximizes intertemporal utility of the median
voter m subject to his reaction function cm(τ) and budget constraint:
max
τ
∫ ∞
0
log cm(τ)e−ρtdt ,(7)
k˙m(τ) = ω(τ)lmk(τ) + (r(τ)− τ)km(τ)− cm(τ) ,(8)
0 ≤ lim
t→∞ k
me
∫ t
0 (r−τ)ds .(9)
Equations (1) to (9) define a differential game for which we assume the government as the
Stackelberg leader and the median voter as the follower.
3. The Markovian-Stackelberg Equilibrium
Lemma 3.1. The Markovian consumption strategy for individual i is given by
(10a) ci(ki, t) = ρ
[
ki + w˜(t)
]
,
where
(10b) w˜(t) =
∫ ∞
t
ω(s)k(s)lie−(z(s)s−z(t)t)ds,
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and
(10c) z(t) = 1/t
∫ t
0
[r(s)− τ(s)]ds
define the present value of wage income and the average net interest rate, respectively.
Proof. The i-th individual maximizes the Hamiltonian
(11) H i = log(ci) + λ
[
wli + (r − τ)ki − ci] .
The equilibrium fulfills the first order conditions (12) and (13) and the transversality
condition (14):
1/ci = λ ,(12)
λ˙ = −λ(r − τ − ρ) ,(13)
0 = lim
t→∞λk
ie−ρt .(14)
From (12) and (13) we obtain the Ramsey rule
(15) c˙i = (r − τ − ρ)ci ,
which applies for all individuals.1 Multiplying (5) by exp[−z(s)s] and integrating provides
for any T ≥ t
(16) ki(T )e−z(T )T − ki(t)e−z(t)t =
∫ T
t
w(s)lie−z(s)sds−
∫ T
t
ci(s)e−z(s)sds.
Inserting ci(s) from (15) and applying the transversality condition one obtains for T →∞
(17) −ki(t)e−z(t)t =
∫ ∞
t
w(s)lie−z(s)sds− ci(t)e−z(t)t
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)ds.
Multiplying by exp[z(t)t] provides (10). 
Since consumption depends only on the current value of the household’s state variable
and current time it constitutes a time-consistent Markovian strategy.2
1Following Kemp et al. (1993, p. 422), the equilibrium should more accurately be called a partial-
feedback equilibrium. If households took into account an influence of their consumption choice on taxes,
the Ramsey rule would read c˙i = (r − τ − τ ′ − ρ)ci.
2It can be verified that
V (ki, t) = (1/ρ) log [ρ+ w˜(t)] +
∫ ∞
t
[(z(s)− ρ)s− (z(t)− ρ)t] exp[−ρ(s− t)]ds
constitutes a value function such that (10) follows from the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation.
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Generally, the government, as a Stackelberg leader could use c(ki, t) as a reaction func-
tion to obtain a time-consistent tax strategy. The appearance of τ in integrals of (10),
however, prevents an analytic solution. Krusell et al. (1997) present numerical solutions.
Here we follow an alternative route. We assume that households expect tax rates to be
constant over time. Note, however, an important difference to Alesina and Rodrik’s orig-
inal contribution. There, the government decides once and for all on a constant tax rate
(τAR). An approach that has been criticized by Krusell et al. for requiring commitment
or, alternatively, for rendering time-inconsistency when re-optimization is possible. In the
following we show that when the government re-optimizes in favor of the median voter at
any point in time it sticks to the initially chosen tax policy τAR i.e. we provide the missing
proof of time-consistency of Alesina and Rodrik’s solution. The necessary assumption that
enables this result is that households suppose that tax rates are constant over time. This
assumption, however, appears to be justified since it turns out that households’ expecta-
tions are correct.
Theorem 3.1. The constant tax rate τ ≡ τAR and the linear consumption strategy
(18a) cm ≡ (ωσm + ρ)km
constitute a time consistent Stackelberg equilibrium, where τAR fulfills
(18b)
ω(τAR)σm + ρ
σm
τ − αω(τAR)
(1− α)ω(τAR) − ρ = 0 .
Proof. The proof consists of three steps: Step 1 and Step 2 obtain the optimal strategy of
the follower and the leader, respectively, Step 3 analyzes the equilibrium.
Step 1: Inserting ci = (ωσi + ρ)ki into (5) yields k˙i/ki = r− τ − ρ, independent from i.
Since all individuals accumulate capital with the same rate, k˙/k = r− τ − ρ = zt− ρ, and
σi remains constant. Hence, aggregate capital evolves according to
(19) k(t) = ρez(t)t
∫ ∞
t
k(s)e−z(s)sds.
Inserting this into ci = (ωσi + ρ)ki and using the fact that ωσi remains constant, ci can
be written as in (10) for all i and in particular for i = m.
Step 2: The corresponding current value Hamiltonian for the government’s maximization
problem reads
(20) HG = log [(ωσm + ρ)km] + µ [r − τ − ρ] km ,
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with first order conditions and transversality condition:
0 =
1
cm
∂ω
∂τ
σmkm + µ
[
∂r
∂τ
− 1
]
km ,(21)
µ˙ = µρ− µ [r − τ − ρ]− 1/km ,(22)
0 = lim
t→∞µk
me−ρt = 0 .(23)
Inserting the derivatives ∂ω/∂τ = (1 − α)ω/τ and ∂r/∂τ = αω/τ obtained from (1)
and (2) into (21) the condition can be expressed as:
(24) µ =
(1− α)ωσm
(τ − αω)cm .
Differentiation with respect to time yields
(25) µ˙ = −(1− α)σm
{
ω − τ(∂ω/∂τ)
(τ − αω)2
1
cm
τ˙ +
ω
τ − αω
(
1
cm
)2 ∂cm
∂km
k˙m
}
.
Inserting ∂ω/∂τ and using ∂cm/∂km = cm/km and k˙m = γkm the differential equation
simplifies to
(26) −µ˙ = µγ + (1− α)αωσ
mγ
(τ − αω)2
1
cm
τ˙ .
And substituting this into (22), dividing by µ and substituting cm yields the optimal tax
strategy:
(27) τ˙ =
τ − αω
α
[
ωσm + ρ
σm
τ − αω
(1− α)ω − ρ
]
.
Since τ˙ is independent from the state of the system, the Markovian solution coincides with
the open-loop solution if τ0 is independent from the initial state.
Step 3: The differential equation (27) has two equilibrium solutions: the capitalist’s
ideal tax rate τC = αω = [α(1− α)A]1/α and the equilibrium which fulfills (18b). This
equilibrium is the one obtained by Alesina and Rodrik and is labelled τAR, τAR > τC . The
derivative of τ˙ with respect to τ is
(28)
∂τ˙
∂τ
= −ρ [1− α(1− α)ω(τC)/τC ] /α = −ρ < 0
at τC , and
(29)
∂τ˙
∂τ
= ρ+ [τAR − αω(τAR)]2/(ατAR) > 0
at τAR. Hence, the equilibrium at τC is stable and the equilibrium at τAR is unstable.
Figure 1 shows the possible tax dynamics according to (27). Any policy starting with a
tax rate smaller than τAR converges towards the capitalistic equilibrium τC .
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Figure 1: Tax Dynamics According to (27)
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Inserting cm and (24) in (23) one obtains
(30) lim
t→∞
[
(1− α)ωσm
(τ − αω)(σmω + ρ)
]
e−ρt = 0 .
For the constant policy τAR the term in brackets is finite and constant and the transver-
sality condition is fulfilled. Thus, the strategy τ(km) = τAR for all km is an optimal
Markovian strategy for the government.
Since the first term of the Hamilitonian (20) is strictly concave in km and τ and the
second term is concave in km and τ , the optimal solution trajectory km∗(t) = km(0)
e[r(τAR)−τAR−ρ]t is unique (See e.g. Theorem 10.1. in Takayama, 1993). And since the
trajectory km∗(t) can only be realized by the constant policy τAR, the policy τAR consti-
tutes the unique Markovian Stackelberg strategy for the government. The choice of τAR
is independent from time, implying that the Stackelberg solution is time consistent. 
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